Urban Informality and the Politics of Clientelism in Karachi
As a megacity, Karachi abodes nearly 15 Million people with varying levels of socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic differences. The metropolis ranks 7th largest city in terms of its population, and 5th least livable city in terms of its socio-economic, environmental, and political stability indicators. Much in line with other third-world megacities, it inhabits a massive population but lacks the infrastructure and capacity to provide them easy and feasible access to basic rights and provisions. As a result, there has been a steady rise in the number of informal settlements in the city to absorb the population bulge.
Much like other informal settlements, issues of solid waste management, unavailability of freshwater, dilapidated health and education sector, load-shedding amid scorching heat-waves, and lack of employment are prevalent in such areas. However, one problem that is often neglected by the is the issue of ‘pluralistic’ political relationship between the powerful authorities, community stakeholders, and political parties. This means that the provision of basic rights and distribution of benefits to the settlers depends on how much they can return in form of political favors to the ruling elite (Deuskar, 2019). Therefore, contextualizing it on Karachi, this short piece aims to highlight how informal settlements can often become a tool to further the political clout of a certain group, exacerbating the socioeconomic problems in megacities.
Clientelism
According to Brown (2015), informal settlements are loosely defined as regions where inhabitants have no tenure security, the neighborhood lacks basic services and infrastructure, and housing is unregulated (Brown, 2015). However, the synonym of informal settlements in our common lexicon, Kutchi Abadi, does not strictly adhere to this definition. Usually, the inhabitants of such Abadis possess some sort of land security in form of a lease, but these leases are often registered in name of different owners due to the lack of regulatory oversight. Thus, these regions are widely classified and identified as ‘informal’ by their socioeconomic status and infrastructure, and ambiguity of the land-ownership in the national registrar.
Similarly, with their undefined and ambiguous status, these settlements are largely ignored by the city governments to evade questions about the unequal distribution of urban opportunities and the city’s prosperity (GSDRC). This is mainly because recognizing their status fully might force them to upgrade and regularize such settlements for improving the quality of life of their inhabitants. For example, this was the case with the Orangi Town area where the city government couldn’t intervene for upgradation due to its unofficial status, and Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was instead launched by leading NGOs to improve the quality of life of Organi residents (Hassan, 1999). Similarly, such areas are also ignored during the construction of megaprojects like the Green Line.
The marginalization as a result of the informal status, therefore, compels the residents to approach local stakeholders ‘unofficially’ to broker deals of mutual exchange. This also offers the latter a lucrative opportunity to gain political clout in such settlements by providing basic facilities like small clinics, education centers, water connections, etc. The vote bank politics and the patron-client relationship, often dubbed as clientelism, not only undermines resident’s democratic rights — as they have to rely on the bare minimum they receive — but also manifests in the rise in regional conflicts (Deuskar, 2019).
The primary reason for the conflicts that emerge as a result of clientelism in informal settlements can be categorized in three ways. Firstly, because the relationship depends on what kind of support the stakeholder receive from their clients, the exchange is not uniform. Households, or colonies that comply fully with the demands of the former, then reap more benefits. On the other hand, the dissidents, or those who disagree are often punished or forced to comply by coercion and violence. Secondly, the state’s democratic apparatus is largely compromised. This means that informal settlers, with a fear of losing their settlements, tend to compromise violence, often ending up paying large sums of extortion money, without approaching the state’s law enforcement authorities. Lastly, these settlements often become a tool of fostering ethnonationalism and religious divide against other communities. Evident from the experience of Karachi, enclaves dominated by ethnic or religious groups often becomes ground of ethnic and religious militancy and terrorism.
Example from Karachi — Kausar Niazi Colony
KNC is located in the vicinity of the middle-high income locality of North Nazimbad Block H and is a par of UC Hydri. Adjacent to Gujjar Nullah, it is home to scores of Pashtun settlers that migrated to Karachi during different military operations. It is also home to several Baloch and Siraiki labor migrants from Baluchistan and Punjab, and low-income groups of Urdu-speakers (Muhajirs).
Brokered by different local stakeholders, it has become a hub of political deals between the residents and different political parties of the Metropolis. As underlined in the scholarship by Guzdar and Mallah (2011), a number of unofficial patrons operate in KNC, backed by Karachi’s top political parties. For example, Zaman Khan, an ethnic Pashtun, who garnered the support of MQM against PPP, has managed to establish a welfare association with an office on the unregularized land. On the other hand, the MQM has established a stronghold in parts of KNC through Zaman (Gazdar & Mallah, 2019). Conversely, the homes of the Siraiki population that started supporting PMLN because of their ethnic roots were demolished by KMC (dominated by MQM), over their wrong political choice — a reflection of a true patron-client relationship in the settlement.
Thus, it is important to underline that clientelism, even though prevalent in several informal settlements, not only undermined people’s access to basic rights but also undermines state authority. Therefore, the local and provincial governments need to intervene to end such relationships in favor of a more democratic and inclusive system. This way only, tensions between people can be reduced.
References
Brown, A. (2015). Planning for sustainable and inclusive cities in the global south. Evidence on Demand, n.p.
Deuskar, C. (2019). Clientelism and Planning in the Informal Settlements of Developing Democracies. Journal of Planning Literature, n.p.
Gazdar, H., & Mallah, H. B. (2019). The Making of a ‘Colony’ in Karachi and the Politics of Regularisation. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, n.p.
Hassan, A. (1999). Akhtar Hameed Khan and the Orangi Pilot Project. . Karachi: City Press.
